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Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) is the study of how to reason about knowledge,
belief, and communication. This paper studies the relative expressivity of certain frag-
ments of the DEL language for public and private communication. It is shown that
the language of public communication with common knowledge and the language of
private communication with common knowledge are expressively incomparable for the
class of all pointed models, which provides a formal proof that public and private com-
munication are fundamentally di!erent. It is also shown that single-recipient private
communication does not add expressive power to the language of basic multi-modal
logic with common knowledge for any class of transitive pointed models. The latter
result provides a sense in which positive introspection—believing our own beliefs—
induces a kind of self-dialog.
1 Introduction
In using modal logic to reason about the knowledge and belief of agents, we assume that a
complete description of a certain moment in time is given by a pointed Kripke model [5, 8].
Now a Kripke model itself consists of a nonzero number of worlds—each having its own truth
assignment describing the basic facts of that world—along with a number of binary relations,
one for each agent, that may or may not hold between any two worlds. The binary relations
represent agent uncertainty: if agent i’s relation connects world ! to world ", then agent i
will consider it possible that the actual world is " whenever the world is in fact !. So for
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agent i to believe something at world !, that something must be true at all those worlds i
considers to be possible with respect to !. This is just Hintikka’s notion of belief [8].
In this setup, knowledge is identified with correct belief: to say that agent i knows a
statement ! at world ! means that agent i believes ! at ! and this belief is correct (that is,
! is true at !) [5].
Now a pointed Kripke model is a pair (M, !) consisting of a Kripke model M and a
particular world ! in M . The world ! is to be thought of as the actual world. The truth
assignment of the actual world ! tells us the basic facts of the situation represented by
(M, !). The purpose of the other worlds in M is to represent the agents’ beliefs. An agent’s
beliefs may concern both the basic facts of the situation (M, !) and also higher-order beliefs
(that is, beliefs about beliefs).
Since we have identified a pointed Kripke model (M, !) with a complete description of
a certain moment in time, a natural way to represent the passage of time is to consider
sequences of moments; that is, we consider sequences
(M1, !1), (M2, !2), (M3, !3), . . . , (Mn, !n)
consisting of pointed Kripke models. This view of time is discrete, with the complete de-
scription of the k-th moment in time given by the pointed Kripke model (Mk, !k).
Thinking of our agents as a distributed system, such a sequence of moments represents a
certain run of the system, where the (k + 1)-st moment is generated from the k-th moment
as a result of the occurrence of a communication to one or more of the agents. In reasoning
about such runs, we often want to consider how the agents’ knowledge and belief is a#ected
by a given kind of communication. Here are two examples.
1. If all agents receive a public communication that some basic statement p is true at the
actual world in moment (M, !), then it ought to be common knowledge in the next
moment (M !, !!) that p is true.
2. If no agent knows whether p is true in moment (M, !), then the private communication
to just those agents in group G that p is true ought to bring about a next moment
(M !, !!) in which p is common knowledge among the agents in G and yet p is still
unknown to the agents not in G.
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) is the study of how to reason about knowledge, belief,
and communication [1, 2, 6, 9, 12]. DEL uses modal logic as the basic language for describing
knowledge, belief, and fact. This basic language is then extended in various ways in order to
describe what happens as a result of some communication. In this paper, we will consider
extensions of the following kind: for a group G of agents and statements ! and ", we will
write the statement
[!!G]"
to mean that " is true after ! is communicated privately to just those agents in group G.
We will use A to represent the group consisting of all agents, so the statement
[!!A]"
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says that " is true after ! is communicated publicly to all agents. Such statements allow us
to express how communication a#ects knowledge and belief. In particular, we can express
our example statements above.
1. [p!A]CAp
In words: after the communication of p to the agents in A, we have that p is common











In words: if no agent i $ A knows p, then after the communication of p to just those
agents in group G, we have that p is common knowledge among those in G and that
no i $ A\G knows p.
(Note: we always assume that A is finite.)
While we have only mentioned public and private communications, there is a natural way
to define much more general kinds of communication that allow for complicated combinations
of privacy and deceit [1]. With such a wide range of communications available, researchers
have begun to try and classify how these many communications relate [1, 3, 6, 7, 9, 11]. For
example, it has been shown that for the basic multi-modal language not containing common
knowledge statements, adding statements [!!A]" of public communication does not add
expressive power [3, 6, 9]. Thus the basic multi-modal language without common knowledge
can already express the concept of public communication. But it has also been shown that
this is not true of the basic multi-modal language with common knowledge statements [3, 12].
Formally, such work is a study of the relative expressivity of the various languages ob-
tained from basic multi-modal logic by adding additional syntax to represent various classes
of communication. Most of the known DEL expressivity work has focused on public commu-
nication [3, 6, 9, 11, 12], though some work has been done on private communication [3]. In
[3], it is shown that the language with common knowledge and private communication can
express a concept that cannot be expressed using the language with common knowledge and
public communication. In the present paper, we show that this result holds the other way
around: the language with common knowledge and public communication can express a con-
cept that cannot be expressed using any combination of private communications. Combining
our result with that of [3], we obtain a proof that public and private communication with
common knowledge are expressively incomparable. This provides a formal sense in which
public and private communication are fundamentally di#erent.
We also show that if our agents’ beliefs satisfy the property of positive introspection
(meaning each agent believes all of his beliefs), then the language of basic multi-modal logic
with common knowledge can already express the concept of single-recipient private commu-
nication. A consequence of this curious result is that private communication to exactly one
recipient is implicit in KD45, a logic typically used for reasoning about belief [5]. Thus there
is a sense in which positively introspective belief already contains single-recipient private
communication, which is a way of saying that believing our own beliefs induces a kind of
self-dialog.
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2 Public and Private Communication
In this section, we introduce the syntax and semantics of our formal language for reasoning
about public and private communication.
2.1 Syntax
Definition 2.1. Let A be a finite nonempty set. The language of public and private com-
munication (over A), written LA, consists of the formulas ! built by the following grammar.
! ::= pk | % | !1 " !2 | Ki! | CG! | [!1!G]!2
for each k $ N, i $ A, & '= G ( A
{pk : k $ N} is the set of propositional letters. A formula written using other logical
connectives is understood as an abbreviation for an appropriate formula in this language.
Abbreviation: for each i $ A, we set [!1! i]!2 := [!1! {i}]!2.
We read the formula [!!G]" as “" is true after the communication of ! to just those
in G.”
It will be useful to define a few fragments of our language LA, with the particular fragment
determined by the various groups of agents that are allowed to receive a communication.
Definition 2.2. Let A be a finite nonempty set. If G ( 2A\{&} is a possibly empty
collection of nonempty subsets of A, then the G-fragment of LA, written LA(G), is the
language obtained from LA by restricting the rule ! )! [!1!G]!2 of formula formation so
that G $ G. Note: LA(&) simply omits the rule ! )! [!1!G]!2 of formula formation all
together. Notation: for a nonempty G ( A, we let LA(G) denote LA({G}).
We now define a few fragments of LA that are of particular interest in the present paper.
Definition 2.3. Let A be a finite nonempty set and G ( A be a nonempty subset.
• The language of public communication (over A), written LA#A, is LA(A).





• The language of private communication (over A) is LA$#A.
Abbreviation: for each i $ A, we set LA#i := LA#{i}.
2.2 Semantics
LA-formulas are interpreted using an extension of Kripke’s semantics for modal logic. This
extension is due to Baltag, Moss, and So$lecki [1, 2].
Definition 2.4. Let A be a finite nonempty set. A model (for A) is a tuple (W, {Ri}i"A, V )
whose components are given as follows.
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• W is a nonempty set whose elements are called worlds (in M).
• For each i $ A: Ri is a binary relation on W .1
• V : {pk : k $ N}! 2W is a function mapping each propositional letter pk to a possibly
empty set V (pk) of worlds.
If M = (W, {Ri}i"A, V ) is a model, then we write ! $ M to mean that ! $ W . A pointed
model (for A) is a pair (M, !) consisting of a model M and a world ! $ M ; the world ! $ M
is called the point of (M, !). To say that pointed model (M, !) for A has a property P of
binary relations—examples include reflexivity, transitivity, seriality, or being euclidean—
means that for M = (W, {Ri}i"A, V ), we have that Ri has property P for each i $ A.2 For
a pointed model (M, !) and a formula ! $ LA, we write M, ! |= ! to mean that ! is true
at (M, !). The negation of M, ! |= ! is written M, ! '|= !. Truth of a formula ! $ LA at a
pointed model (M, !) is given by the following induction on the construction of !.
• M, ! |= pk means that ! $ V (pk).
• M, ! '|= %.
• M, ! |= !1 " !2 means that M, ! '|= !1 or M, ! |= !2.
• M, ! |= Ki! means that M, " |= ! for each " $ M satisfying !Ri".
• M, ! |= CG! means that for each non-negative integer n $ N, if {!k}nk=0 is a sequence
of worlds in M such that !0 = ! and each k $ N satisfying k < n has an i $ G such
that !kRi!k+1, then M, !n |= !.
• M, ! |= [!1!G]!2 means that either we have M, ! '|= !1 or else we have both M, ! |=
!1 and M [!1!G], (!, 0) |= ", where the model M [!1!G] is the tuple
!
W [!1!G], {Ri[!1!G]}i"A, V [!1!G]
#
whose components are given as follows.
– W [!1!G] := {(!, 0) $ W * {0} : M, ! |= !1} +
{(!, 1) $ W * {1} : ! $ W}
– For each i $ G: Ri[!1!G] is the set
$!
(!, a), (", b)
#
$ (W [!1!G])2 : (!Ri") # (a = b)
%
1R is a binary relation on a set W i! R ( W 2. If R is a binary relation on a set W and ",# $ W , then
we write "R# to mean that (",#) $ Ri.
2Let R be a binary relation on a set W . R is reflexive i! "R" for each " $ W . R is transitive i! "R#
and #R$ together imply "R$ for each ",#,$ $ W . R is serial i! for each " $ W , there is a # $ W such
that "R#. R is euclidean i! "R# and "R$ together imply #R$ for each ",#,$ $ W .
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– For each j $ A\G: Rj[!1!G] is the set
$!
(!, a), (", b)
#
$ (W [!1!G])2 : (!Rj") # (b = 1)
%
– V [!1!G](pk) :=
&
(!, a) $ W [!1!G] : ! $ V (pk)
'
If I is a set of pointed models for A, then to to say that a formula ! $ LA is valid for I,
written I |= !, means that M, ! |= ! for each pointed model (M, !) $ I. To say that a
formula ! $ LA is valid, written |= !, means that ! is valid for the set of all pointed models
for A.
The idea behind the construction of the model M [!!G] may be understood as follows.
The worlds in M [!!G] of the form (!, 0) are just those worlds of M at which ! is true,
while the worlds in M [!!G] of the form (!, 1) make up a copy of the model M . The
binary relations in M [!!G] are then defined so that from a world (!, 0), agents in G will
only consider possible worlds of the form (", 0) while agents in A\G will only consider
possible worlds of the form (", 1). Thus the agents in G jointly eliminate from consideration
all worlds in M at which ! is not true—and in this sense it becomes common knowledge
among G that ! was communicated—while the agents in A\G are e#ectively unaware that
the communication of ! to G ever occurred. So in case we have that M, ! |= !, then the
construction of M [!!G] takes us from the moment in time given by the pointed model
(M, !) to a next moment in time given by the pointed model
!
M [!!G], (!, 0)
#
. It is in this
way that communication moves time from one moment to the next in this framework.
3 Relative Expressivity
Expressivity is the comparative study of the propositions expressible in two languages that
share a common semantics. The intuitive question this study attempts to answer is the
following: can one language say everything that the other language can say?
Definition 3.1. Let A be a finite nonempty set, L1 and L2 be sub-languages of LA, and I
be a set of pointed models for A. A translation function (from L1 to L2 over I) is a function
u : L1 ! L2 that maps each formula ! $ L1 to a formula !u $ L2 such that for each " $ L1
and each I $ I, we have I |= " if and only if I |= "u. We write L1 #!I L2 to mean that
there exists a translation function u : L1 ! L2 over I. The negation of L1 #!I L2 is written
L1 '#!I L2.
Our informal reading of L1 #!I L2 is “L2 can say at least as much as L1.” This reading
leads us to the following definition of relative expressivity.
Definition 3.2 (Relative Expressivity). We adopt the notation of Definition 3.1.
• To say that L1 is more expressive (for I) than L2 means that L1 '#!I L2 and L2 #!I L1.
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• To say that L1 and L2 are equally expressive (for I) means that L1 #!I L2 and
L2 #!I L1.
• To say that L1 and L2 are expressively incomparable (for I) means that L1 '#!I L2 and
L2 '#!I L1.
Our definition of L1 #!I L2 is our formalization for the notion of L2 saying at least as
much as L1. This gives us a partial ordering on languages, from which we defined the strict
partial ordering that is relative expressivity. But note that these definitions all depend on
a given set I of pointed models for A. In particular, we will show in the last section how a
specific choice of I a#ects the outcome of an expressivity result.
4 Some Known Results on Relative Expressivity
We recall the first expressivity theorems in DEL.
Theorem 4.1 (Plaza-Gerbrandy [6, 9]). Let A be a finite nonempty set. For each G (
2A\{&}, let LA$C(G) be the language obtained from LA(G) by omitting the rule ! )! CG! of
formula formation. Then LA$C(&) and LA$C(A) are equally expressive for any class of pointed
models for A.
The Plaza-Gerbrandy Theorem says that public communication does not add expressive
power to the basic language of multi-modal logic without common knowledge.
Theorem 4.2 ([1, 3]). Let A be a finite nonempty set. Adopting the notation of the Plaza-
Gerbrandy Theorem, we have that LA$C(&) and LA$C(2A\{&}) are equally expressive for any
class of pointed models for A.3
Theorem 4.2 says that public and private communication do not add expressive power
to the basic language of multi-modal logic without common knowledge.
We now recall a few known results concerning the relative expressivity of certain frag-
ments of LA.
Theorem 4.3 ([3, 12]). Let A be a set satisfying |A| = 1 and let I be the set of all pointed
models for A. Then LA#A '#!I LA(&).
Since LA(&) #!I LA#A for each finite nonempty set A, Theorem 4.3 tells us that public
communication strictly increases the expressivity of the language LA(&) of basic multi-modal
logic with common knowledge for the class of all pointed models for A. Contrasting this
theorem with the Plaza-Gerbrandy Theorem, we see that common knowledge is necessary
for this expressivity increase to occur.
Theorem 4.4 ([3, 12]). Let A be a finite set satisfying |A| , 2 and let I be the set of all
reflexive, transitive, and euclidean pointed models for A. Then LA#A '#!I LA(&).
3Theorem 4.2 is actually a special case of a more general theorem from [1, 3]: no collection of the general
communication types in [1, 3] adds expressivity to LA!C(&).
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Theorem 4.4 tells us that if there are at least two agents in the finite set A, then public
communication strictly increases the expressivity of the language LA(&) of basic multi-modal
logic with common knowledge for the class of all pointed models for A that are reflexive,
transitive, and euclidean.4 The latter trio of properties characterizes the class of frames
valid for the logic S5, a logic typically used for reasoning about knowledge [5]. Thus public
communication strictly increases the expressivity of the (typical) logic of knowledge when
common knowledge is present. Contrasting this theorem with Theorem 4.2, we again see
that common knowledge is necessary for the increase in expressive power.
Theorem 4.5 ([3]). Let A be a finite set satisfying |A| , 2 and let I be the set of all pointed
models for A. Then LA#i '#!I LA#A for each i $ A.5
Theorem 4.5 says that if there are at least two agents in the finite set A, then the language
LA#A of public communication with common knowledge cannot say everything that can be
said by the language of single-recipient private communication with common knowledge.
Contrasting this theorem with Theorem 4.2, we again see the necessity of common knowledge
for an increase in expressive power.
5 Our Results on Relative Expressivity
Our first result, Theorem 5.2, is the strongest possible form for the reverse direction of
Theorem 4.5. But before we state our theorem, we make the following auxiliary definition
for use in our proof.
Definition 5.1. Let A be a finite nonempty set and G ( A be a nonempty subset. Let
{gi}|G|i=1 be a fixed enumeration of G. Then given a model M = (W, {Ri}i"A, V ) for A and
binary relation R on W , the expansion of M at R by {gi}|G|i=1 is the model (W !, {R!i}i"A, V !)
for A whose components are given as follows.
• W ! := W +
&
(!, ", i) : (!, ") $ R, i $ N with 1 - i - |G|. 1
'
Abbreviations: for each (!, ") $ R, we set (!, ", 0) := ! and (!, ", |G|) := ".
• For each i $ N satisfying 1 - i - |G|:
R!gi := Rgi +
$!
(!, ", i. 1), (!, ", i)
#
: (!, ") $ R
%
• For each i $ A\G: set R!i := Ri.
• V !(pk) := V (pk) +
&
(!, ", i) $ W ! : i - |G|. 1 and ! $ V (pk)
'
4Theorem 4.4 fails in the case |A| = 1, since we then have LA"A ! I LA(&) for I the class of all reflexive,
transitive, and euclidean pointed models for A [3].
5Theorem 4.5 fails in the case |A| = 1 for a trivial reason: |A| = 1 implies that LA"i = LA"A for each
i $ A.
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The expansion of M at R by {gi}|G|=1 simply takes each edge (!, ") $ R and expands it




g1 !!(!, ", 1)
g2 !!(!, ", 2)
g3 !! · · ·
g|G|!1 !!(!, ", |G|. 1)
g|G| !!"
For i - |G|. 1, the set of propositional letters true at (!, ", i) is exactly the set of proposi-
tional letters true at !.
We may now state and prove our first theorem of this section. Compare our theorem
with Theorem 4.5.
Theorem 5.2. Let A be a finite nonempty set. Then LA#A '#!I LA$#A for the set I of all
pointed models for A.
Proof. If |A| = 1, then LA$#A = LA(&), and the result then follows from Theorem 4.3. So we
may assume that |A| , 2. For each non-negative integer n $ N, we define the model
Bn := (W n, {Rni }i, V n)
for A and the relation Rn ( W n *W n as follows.
• W n := {%Lk : k $ N and 1 - k - n + 1} +
{%Rk : k $ N and 1 - k - n + 1} + {!, "}
Abbreviations: we set %L0 := %
R





• For each i $ A, set Rni := &.




W n\{"} if k = 0
{!} if k = 1











k ) : 1 - k - n + 2
'
Now fix an enumeration {ai}|A|i=1 of A. For each n $ N, we define the model Cn as the
expansion of Bn at Rn by {ai}|A|i=1. See Figure 1 for a picture of Cn.
We now define a depth function d : LA$#A ! N by the following induction on LA$#A-formula
construction.
• d(pk) := 0 for k $ N
• d(%) := 0





• d(Ki!) := 1 + d(!) for i $ A









We will prove the following statement that we call S: for each ! $ LA$#A, each n $ N satisfying
d(!) < (n+1) · |A|, each positive integer k $ N+ satisfying d(!)+(k.1) · |A| < (n+1) · |A|,
and each i $ N satisfying both 0 - i - |A| . 1 and d(!) + i + (k . 1) · |A| < (n + 1) · |A|,
we have that
Cn, (%Lk , i) |= ! i# Cn, (%Rk , i) |= ! .
Observe that for the LA#A-formula $ := [p0 ! A]¬CA¬p1 we have Cn, %L1 '|= $ and Cn, %R1 |= $
for each n $ N. Applying Statement S, it then follows that no function u : LA#A ! LA$#A
satisfies the property that the two equivalences
Cn, %L1 |= $ i# Cn, %L1 |= $u and
Cn, %R1 |= $ i# Cn, %R1 |= $u
both hold for each n $ N. Since I is the set of all pointed models for A, we then have that
LA#A '#!I LA$#A, which completes our proof. So what remains is for us to prove Statement S.
We proceed by an induction on the construction of LA$#A-formulas. The Boolean cases of this
induction are straightforward, so we will only handle the non-Boolean cases.
• Case: Kj! for some j $ A.
Suppose that Cn, (%Lk , i) '|= Kj! and that d(Kj!) + i + (k . 1) · |A| < (n + 1) · |A|.
In case i < |A|. 1, we then have that Cn, (%Lk , i + 1) '|= !. Since d(Kj!) = 1 + d(!),
it follows that d(!) + (i + 1) + (k . 1) · |A| < (n + 1) · |A| and so Cn, (%Rk , i + 1) '|= !
by the induction hypothesis. But then Cn, (%Rk , i) '|= Kj!.
In case i = |A|. 1, we have from our assumptions that Cn, (%Lk+1, 0) '|= ! and d(!) +
k · |A| < (n + 1) · |A|. It follows from the induction hypothesis that Cn, (%Rk+1, 0) '|= !
and thus that Cn, (%Rk , i) '|= Kj!.
The argument that Cn, (%Rk , i) '|= Kj! implies Cn, (%Lk , i) '|= Kj! is shown similarly.
• Case: CA!.
Cn, (%Lk , i) '|= CA! is equivalent to Cn, w '|= ! for some w $ Cn. But the latter is
equivalent to Cn, (%Rk , i) '|= CA!.
• Case: CG! for some nonempty G ! A.
It follows from our assumption G ! A that Cn, (%Lk , i) '|= CG! is equivalent to Cn, w '|=
! for some w $ Cn satisfying the property the number of edges between (%Lk , i) and w
is at most |G|. w may have one of two forms and we consider a separate case for each
form.
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Suppose w is of the form (%Lk , i
!) with i! $ N satisfying i - i! - |A| . 1 and further
that d(CG!) + i + (k . 1) · |A| < (n + 1) · |A|. Since d(CG!) = |A| + d(!), it follows
that d(!)+ i! +(k. 1) · |A| < (n+1) · |A| because i! < i+ |A|. Applying the induction
hypothesis, we have Cn, (%Rk , i
!) '|= !, from which it follows that Cn, (%Rk , i) '|= CG!.
Suppose w is of the form (%Lk+1, i





further that d(CG!)+i+(k.1)·|A| < (n+1)·|A|. Since d(CG!) = |A|+d(!), it follows
that d(!)+ i! +k · |A| < (n+1) · |A| because we have i! + |A| - |G|+ i < |A|+ i by our
assumption G ! A. Applying the induction hypothesis, we have Cn, (%Rk+1, i!) '|= !,
from which it follows that Cn, (%Rk , i) '|= CG!.
The argument that Cn, (%Rk , i) '|= CG! implies Cn, (%Lk , i) '|= CG! is shown similarly.














, we have each of the following.
– d(!) + i! + (k . 1) · |A| < (n + 1) · |A| for each i! $ N satisfying i - i! - |A|. 1
Applying the induction hypothesis, we have that
Cn, (%Lk , i
!) |= ! i# Cn, (%Rk , i!) |= !
for each i! $ N satisfying i - i! - |A|. 1.




Applying the induction hypothesis, we have that
Cn, (%Lk+1, i
!) |= ! i# Cn, (%Rk+1, i!) |= !





Without loss of generality, we may assume that
Cn, (%Lk , i) |= ! and Cn, (%Rk , i) |= ! ,
for otherwise the desired result follows trivially. Now let sL be the longest sequence
of worlds in Cn such that the first member of sL is (%Lk , i) and s
L satisfies each of the
following: Cn, w |= ! for each world w in sL and each pair (w1, w2) of consecutive
worlds in sL satisfies w1Rjw2 for some j $ G. Since G ! A, the nonempty sequence sL
is necessarily finite. Now let sR be the sequence of worlds in Cn obtained by replacing
each occurrence of a superscript L in a world in sL by a superscript R. It follows from
what we showed in the two bulleted items above that sR is the longest sequence of
worlds in Cn such that the first member of sR is (%Rk , i) and s
R satisfies each of the
following: Cn, w |= ! for each w in sR and each pair (w1, w2) of consecutive worlds
in sL satisfies w1Rjw2 for some j $ G. Now if the unique outgoing edge of the last
member in sL is labeled by some j $ G, then the tree model generated by
!
Cn[!!G], ((%Lk , i), 0)
#
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is isomorphic to the sub-model of Cn consisting of those worlds in the sequence sL and,
by what we showed in the two bulleted items above, the tree model generated by
!
Cn[!!G], ((%Rk , i), 0)
#
is also isomorphic to the sub-model of Cn consisting of those worlds in the sequence
sL.6 But it then follows that
Cn[!!G],
!





(%Rk , i), 0
#
|= " ,
as desired. So let us assume that the unique outgoing edge of the last member in sL is
labeled by some j $ A\G. We then have that the tree model generated by
!
Cn[!!G], ((%Lk , i), 0)
#
is isomorphic to the tree model generated by
!





(%Lk , i), 0
#
|= " i# Cn, (%Lk , i) |= " .
By similar reasoning, we also have
Cn[!!G],
!
(%Rk , i), 0
#














, we have that d(") + i + (k . 1) · |A| < (n + 1) · |A|. Applying
the induction hypothesis, we have that
Cn, (%Lk , i) |= " i# Cn, (%Rk , i) |= " ,
which completes the proof of this theorem (Theorem 5.2).
Theorem 5.2 tells us that the language LA$#A of private communication with common
knowledge cannot say everything that can be said in the language LA#A of public communi-
cation with common knowledge. Applying this to Theorem 4.5 yields the following result.
Theorem 5.3. Let A be a finite set satisfying |A| , 2 and let I be the set of all pointed
models for A. Then the languages LA#A and L
A
$#A are expressively incomparable for I.
Proof. Since we have that LA#i #!I LA$#A for each i $ A, it follows from Theorem 4.5 that
LA$#A '#!I LA#A. Applying Theorem 5.2, the result follows.
Finally, we show that in contrast to Theorem 4.5, we have that single-recipient private
communication does not add expressivity to the language of basic multi-modal logic with
common knowledge for any class of transitive pointed models for A.
6The tree model generated by a pointed model is sometimes called the unraveling generated by a pointed
model. See [10] for definitions and results relevant to a language extending LA, and see [4] for definitions
















Figure 1. Picture representing the model Cn defined in the proof of Theorem 5.2. An edge from w to w#
labeled “/A0” represents a path from w to w# whose edges enumerate A in some fixed order.
Theorem 5.4. Let A be a finite nonempty set, G :=
&
{i} : i $ A
'
, and I be any set of
transitive pointed models for A. Then LA(G) #!I LA(&).
Proof. For each formula ! $ LA and each nonempty G ( A, we let EG! abbreviate the
conjunction
"
i"G Ki!. In Figure 2, we define a function u : L
A(G) ! LA(&). For each
formula % $ LA, we show that I |= % 1 %u. Our argument proceeds by an induction
on the depth of announcement modals in % (that is, modals of the form ["! i] for " $
LA(G) and i $ A) with a sub-induction on the number of symbols in %. This induction
follows the inductive definition in Figure 2 of the function u. Many cases of the induction
are straightforward, so we will only handle the non-straightforward cases. (Note that the
condition of transitivity is used only in the second half of the last case we handle.)
• I |= [!! i]Kj" 1 !u " Kj"u when j '= i
Suppose M, ! '|= [!! i]Kj" for some (M, !) $ I. This means that M, ! |= ! and
M [!! i], (!, 0) '|= Kj". Thus M [!! i], (", 1) '|= " for some " $ M satisfying !Rj".
It follows from the induction hypothesis that M, ! |= !u and M [!! i], (", 1) '|= "u.
But the tree model generated by
!
M [!! i], (", 1)
#
is isomorphic to the tree model
generated by (M, "), so it then follows that M, " '|= "u. Since !Rj", we then have
that M, ! '|= Kj"u. Taken together, we have shown that M, ! '|= !u " Kj"u.
Conversely, suppose M, ! '|= !u " Kj"u for some (M, !) $ I. This means that M, ! |=
!u and M, " '|= "u for some " $ M satisfying !Rj". It follows from the induction
hypothesis that M, ! |= ! and M, " '|= ". But the tree model generated by (M, ") is
isomorphic to the tree model generated by
!
M [!! i], (", 1)
#
, so it then follows that
M [!! i], (", 1) '|= ". Since M, ! |= ! and !Rj", we have that (!, 0) $ M [!! i] and
(!, 0)Rj[!! i](", 1) and thus that M [!! i], (!, 0) '|= Kj". Taken together, we have
shown that M, ! '|= [!! i]Kj".




Suppose M, ! '|= [!! i]Ki" for some (M, !) $ I. This means that M, ! |= ! and
M [!! i], (!, 0) '|= Ki". Thus M [!! i], (", 0) '|= " for some " $ W satisfying !Ri".
But this means that M, " '|= [!! i]". Now it follows from the sub-induction hypothesis
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, and the induction hypothesis implies that M, ! |= !u. So









for some (M, !) $ I. This




for some " $ M satisfying !Ri". It
follows by the sub-induction hypothesis that M, " '|= [!! i]". But this means that
M, " |= ! and M [!! i], (", 0) '|= ". Applying the induction hypothesis, we have that
M, ! |= ! and thus that (!, 0) $ M [!! i]. But then (!, 0)Ri[!! i](", 0) and thus
M [!! i], (!, 0) '|= Ki", which is what it means to say that M, ! '|= [!! i]Ki".
• I |= [!! i]CG" 1
!
[!! i]"
#u # (!u " EGCG"u) when i /$ G
Suppose M, ! '|= [!! i]CG" for some (M, !) $ I. This means that M, ! |= ! and





of worlds in M [!! i] such that (!0, a0) = (!, 0), each
k $ N satisfying 0 < k - n has ak = 1, each k $ N satisfying k < n has a j $ G
with (!k, ak)Rj[!! i](!k+1, ak+1), and M [!! i], (!n, an) '|= ". In case n = 0, we then





hypothesis. So suppose that n > 0. We then have that M, !n '|= " because the tree
model generated by
!
M [!! i], (!n, 1)
#
is isomorphic to the tree model generated by
(M, !n). Applying the induction hypothesis, it follows that M, !n '|= "u. But {!k}nk=1
is a nonempty sequence of worlds in M such that each k $ N satisfying 1 - k < n has a
j $ G with !kRj!k+1, so M, !1 '|= CG"u. We also have that !Rj!1 for some j $ G, and
thus M, ! '|= EGCG"u. Further, the induction hypothesis implies that we may conclude
M, ! |= !u from the fact that M, ! |= !, and thus M, ! '|= !u " EGCG"u. So no matter
whether n = 0 or n > 0, we have shown that M, ! '|=
!
[!! i]"
#u # (!u " EGCG"u).
Conversely, suppose that M, ! '|=
!
[!! i]"
#u # (!u " EGCG"u) for some (M, !) $ I.




, the sub-induction hypothesis implies that M, ! '|= [!! i]"
and thus M [!! i], (!, 0) '|= ". The latter implies that M [!! i], (!, 0) '|= CG" and thus
that M, ! '|= [!! i]CG". In case M, ! '|= !u " EGCG"u, then M, ! |= !u and for some
n $ N with n > 0, there is a sequence {!k}nk=0 of worlds in M such that !0 = !, each
k $ N with k < n has a j $ G with !kRj!k+1, and M, !n '|= "u. Applying the induction
hypothesis, we have that M, !n '|= " and thus that M [!! i], (!n, 1) '|= " because the
tree model generated by
!
M [!! i], (!n, 1)
#
is isomorphic to the tree model generated
by (M, !n). Again applying the induction hypothesis, it follows that M, ! |= ! from
the fact that M, ! |= !u, and thus (!, 0) = (!0, 0) $ M [!! i]. Defining the sequence






sequence of worlds in M [!! i] such that (!, 0) = (!0, a0), each k $ N satisfying k < n
has a j $ G with (!k, ak)Rj[!! i](!k+1, ak+1), and M [!! i], (!n, an) '|= ". But then
we have shown that M, ! '|= [!! i]CG".
• I |= [!! i]CG" 1 !u " Ci
!
[!! i]"
#u # Ci(!u " EG\{i}CG"u) when i $ G
Suppose that M, ! '|= [!! i]CG" for some (M, !) $ I. This means that M, ! |= !





of worlds in M [!! i] such that (!0, a0) = (!, 0), each k $ N satisfying k < m has
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(!k, ak)Ri[!! i](!k+1, ak+1), each k $ N satisfying m < k < n has a j $ G with
(!k, ak)Rj[!! i](!k+1, ak+1), and M [!! i], (!n, an) '|= ". Note that we have ak = 0
for each k $ N satisfying k - m and ak = 1 for each k $ N satisfying m < k - n. Now
it follows from the induction hypothesis that M, ! |= !u by the fact that M, ! |= !.
So what remains is for us to show that
M, ! '|= Ci
!
[!! i]"
#u # Ci(!u " EG\{i}CG"u) .
We consider two cases.
– Case: n = 0 or 0 < m = n.
We have M, !n '|= [!! i]" and thus the sub-induction hypothesis yields M, !n '|=!
[!! i]"
#u
. Since m = n, it follows that {!k}nk=0 is a sequence of worlds in
M such that !0 = ! and each k $ N satisfying k < n has !kRi!k+1. Thus





– Case: 0 < m < n.
(!m, 0) $ M [!! i] implies that M, !m |= ! and thus that M, !m |= !u by the
induction hypothesis. Since m < n, the sequence {!k}nk=m of worlds in M is
nonempty and satisfies each of the following: !mRj0!m+1 for some j0 $ G\{i},
and each k $ N satisfying m + 1 - k < n has a j $ G with !kRj!k+1. Now
m < n implies that an = 1, and thus M, !n '|= " follows from the fact that the
tree model generated by (M, !n) is isomorphic to the tree model generated by!
M [!! i], (!n, an)
#
. Applying the induction hypothesis, we have that M, !n '|=
"u. But then we have shown that M, !m '|= !u " EG\{i}CG"u. Since {!k}mk=0 is
a sequence of worlds in M such that each k $ N satisfying k < m has !kRi!k+1,
we then have that M, ! '|= Ci(!u " EG\{i}CG"u).
Conversely, suppose that
M, ! '|= !u " Ci
!
[!! i]"
#u # Ci(!u " EG\{i}CG"u)
for some (M, !) $ I. Thus M, ! |= !u, from which it follows by the induction hypoth-
esis that M, ! |= !. So what remains is for us to show that M [!! i], (!, 0) '|= CG".
We consider two cases.




This means that there is a sequence {!k}nk=0 of worlds in M such that !0 = !,





the sub-induction hypothesis, we have that M, !n '|= [!! i]". The latter implies
that M, !n |= !, and hence (!n, 0) $ M [!! i]. Now it follows by the transitivity
of Ri that !Ri!n, and thus (!, 0)Ri[!! i](!n, 0). But M, !n '|= [!! i]" also
implies that M [!! i], (!n, 0) '|= ", so we have M [!! i], (!, 0) '|= CG" by the fact








#u := "u " pk!
["! i]%
#u := "u " %!

































Figure 2. Inductive definition of a function u : LA(G) ! LA(&) used in the proof of Theorem 5.4.
– Case: M, ! '|= Ci(!u " EG\{i}CG"u)
This means that there is a sequence {!k}nk=0 of worlds in M such that !0 = !,
each k $ N satisfying k < n has !kRi!k+1, and M, !n '|= !u " EG\{i}CG"u. Thus
M, !n |= !u, and so the induction hypothesis implies that M, !n |= !. We there-
fore have that (!n, 0) $ M [!! i], from which it follows that (!, 0)Ri[!! i](!n, 0)
by the transitivity of Ri. Applying the induction hypothesis again, we have that
M, !n '|= EG\{i}CG", which means that there is a sequence {!k}mk=n for some
m $ N with m > n such that !nRj0!n+1 for some j0 $ G\{i}, each k $ N
satisfying n + 1 - k < m has a j $ G with !kRj!k+1, and M, !m '|= ". But then
(!, 0), (!n, 0), (!n+1, 1), (!n+2, 1), . . . , (!m, 1)
is a sequence of worlds in M [!! i] such that each pair (w,w!) of consecutive worlds
in the sequence has a j $ G such that wRj[!! i]w!. Further, M [!! i], (!m, 1) '|=
" by the fact that the tree model generated by
!
M [!! i], (!m, 1)
#
is isomorphic
to the tree model generated by (M, !m). But then M [!! i], (!, 0) '|= CG".
6 Conclusion
We have surveyed public and private communication in Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL)
with a focus on questions of relative expressivity. Our work adds the following to the list of
known results.
1. Theorem 5.2: the language LA$#A of all private communications with common knowledge
cannot say everything that can be said in the language LA#A of public communication
with common knowledge for the class of all pointed models for A.
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In Theorem 5.3, we combined Theorem 5.2 with a known result—Theorem 4.5 [3]—to
show that for 2 - |A| < &, the languages LA$#A and LA#A are expressively incomparable
for the class of all pointed models for A. This provides us with a formal proof that
public and private communication are fundamentally di#erent.
2. Theorem 5.4: single-recipient private communication does not add expressivity to the
language of basic multi-modal logic with common knowledge for any class of transitive
pointed models.
As a consequence, single-recipient private communication is implicit in KD45, a logic
typically used for reasoning about belief [5]. This provides us a sense in which positive
introspection—believing our own beliefs—induces a kind of self-dialog.
More generally, the work of this paper is a small step in a larger project whose eventual
goal is to provide a complete characterization of the relative expressivity for the many DEL
languages [1, 12]. Given the extremely limited collection of known expressivity results that
have been discovered since the Plaza-Gerbrandy Theorem became well-known in 1999 [6, 9],
this task may turn out to be quite di&cult. But the task will nonetheless be of use in getting
a better understanding of the gamut of communicative types available through the many
DEL languages.
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